Let v(n) be the minimum number of voters with transitive preferences which are needed to generate any strong preference pattern (ties not allowed) on n candidates. Let k = ⌊log 2 n⌋. We show that v(n) ≤ n − k if n and k have different parity, and v(n) ≤ n − k + 1 otherwise.
Introduction
Let us consider a set of n candidates or options A = {a, b, c, . . .} which are ordered by order of preference by each individual of a set U of voters. Thus, each α ∈ U can be identified with a permutation α = x 1 x 2 · · · x n of the elements of A, where x i is preferred over x j (denoted x i → x j ) if and only if i < j. The set of voters determine what is called a preference pattern which summarizes the majority opinion about each pair of options.
In this note only strong preference patterns are considered, that is, it is assumed that there are no ties. So, each preference pattern on n options is fully represented by a tournament T n on n vertices where the arc (a, b) means a → b, that is, a is preferred over b by a majority of voters. Conversely, given any pattern T n we may be interested in finding a minimum set of voters, denoted U (T n ), which generates T n . Let v(T n ) = |U (T n )| and let v(n) = max{v(T n )} computed over all tournaments with n vertices. In [2] McGarvey showed that v(n) is well defined, that is, for any T n there always exist a set U (T n ) and v(n) ≤ 2 n 2 . Sterns [3] showed that v(n) ≤ n + 2 if n is even and v(n) ≤ n + 1 if n is odd. Finally, Erdös and Moser [1] were able to prove that v(n) is of the order O(n/ log 2 n). In fact all the above results were given for preference patterns which are not necessarily strong (in this case a tie between a and b can be represented either by an absence of arcs between a and b or by an edge {a, b}). It is worth noting that, contrarily to the method of Erdös and Moser, the approaches of McGarvey and Sterns give explicit constructions of a set of voters which generate any desired pattern. In the case of strong patterns we improve the results of the latter authors by giving and inductive method to obtain a suitable set of voters.
Strong preference patterns
Let us begin with a very simple but useful result, which is a direct consequence of the fact that in our preference patterns there are no ties.
Lemma 2.1. Let v(n) be defined as above. Then, v(n) is odd. P roof. By contradiction, suppose that, for a given strong pattern T n , v(n) is even. Then, for any two options a, b we have that either a → b or b → a with at least two votes of difference. Consequently, the removing of a voter does not change the preference pattern.
✷ Notice that, from this lemma, Sterns' result particularized for strong patterns are v(n) ≤ n + 1 for n even and v(n) ≤ n for n odd.
Our results are based on the following theorem.
Theorem 2.2. Let T n+2 be a strong pattern containing two options, say a and b. Let
. . , α r } be a minimum set of r = v(T n ) voters generating T n . By Lemma 2.1, r is odd. Besides, suppose without loss of generality that a → b, and consider the sets
(any other case follows trivially from this one), we can write A 1 = {y 1 , y 2 , . . . , y s , . . . , y t } and A 2 = {y s , y s+1 , . . . , y t , . . . , y m }, 1 < s ≤ t < m. Now, let us define the sequences γ = y 1 y 2 · · · y s−1 , δ = y s y s+1 · · · y t , σ = y t+1 y t+2 · · · y m and µ = y m+1 y m+2 · · · y n , and consider the following set of r + 2 voters:
where γ = y s−1 · · · y 2 y 1 , δ = y t · · · y s+1 y s , etc. Now it is routine to verify that these voters generate the pattern T n+2 and, hence, v(T n+2 ) ≤ r + 2 = v(T n ) + 2. ✷ A tournament or strong preference pattern T is called transitive if a → b and b → c implies a → c. In this case it is clear that v(T ) = 1. The proof of the following result can be found in [1] .
Theorem 2.3 ([1]
). Let f (n) be the maximum number such that every tournament on n vertices has a transitive subtournament on f (n) vertices. Then, ⌊log 2 n⌋ + 1 ≤ f (n) ≤ 2⌊log 2 n⌋ + 1.
The proof of the lower bound, due to Sterns, gives a very simple algorithm to find a subtournament which attains such a bound, see again [1] .
From Theorems 2.2 and 2.3 we get the following corollary.
